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This paper investigates the California dairy quota.  The quota rate of return has
been relatively high.  The variability of returns is high relative to government bonds but
not relative to the S&P500.  Most of the returns are from monthly dividends, but most of
the variability is from the capital gains.1
Introduction
California dairy policy is a complex mesh of State and Federal regulations.  This
paper investigates only one component of this policy--the California dairy quota.  This
research is valuable because the State and Federal governments and industry groups all
have expressed strong interest in a better understanding of the effects of the quota
program.
The California dairy quota program has some features that allow this research to
contribute more generally to understanding the capitalization of agricultural policy
benefits and the impact of risks associated with agricultural policy (Barichello, Lermer
and Stanbury, Sumner and Alston).  Particular program features help make flow returns
to quota ownership and the capitalized value of the quota more transparent than they are
in many other agricultural quota programs.  In addition, we have assembled a more
complete data set on quota than is available for most other policy-created assets.
Capitalization of program benefits reflects expectations about government policy.
Therefore, the value of policy-created assets reflects farmers' assessments of the level and
variability of future returns to policy.  We use the term "policy risk" to reflect certain
characteristics of the policy-created quota asset.  This paper focuses on the behavior of
the market for California dairy quota as a policy-created asset market.  In particular, we
examine contributions to the flow returns to quota, the variability of these returns and the
risk characteristics of quota. The concept “policy risk” has two distinct but related
components.  "Portfolio risk" refers to the effect of perceived policy variation on the
contribution of the policy-created asset to the variability of the returns of the relevant
portfolio.  This definition is consistent with the use of the term "risk" in portfolio analysis2
and capital asset pricing.  "Default risk" refers to the perceived probability of substantial
negative policy change—the default of an established government policy. Thus, in this
sense, risk is similar to how the term is used in discussion of environmental risks or in
discussion of the risk of default.  Eliminating the program and termination of policy
benefits is the extreme case of default risk, and the probability of program termination
reflects default risk.  This paper focuses on portfolio risk and examines the behavior of
the quota as an asset.
The Basic Operation of the Quota Program
Before discussing characteristics of the asset market, it is important to appreciate
how the flow returns to quota are generated.  The dairy quota program began in 1969. As
a step towards pooling milk revenues, quota was allocated to producers in proportion to
their fluid milk sells.
Aggregate milk production is M=Si Mi, where Mi is the production of producer i.
Let total output equal total use, M=C=Sj Cj, where Cj is the milk used in one of the five
milk classes (j=1, 2, 3, 4a, 4b).  Pool revenue (R)
1,
 given class prices (Pj), can be
calculated as follows:
R=P1*C1+P2*C2+P3*C3+P4a*C4a+P4b*(M-C1-C2-C3-C4a).
The quota program has no direct role in setting milk prices by end-use or in
allocating milk among classes.  The quota program applies to the dispersal of pool
revenue.  Quota ownership varies across farms, and the revenue of an individual farm
depends on the amount of quota that the farm owns as well as milk production and class
prices.  Prior to 1994, monthly returns for quota were calculated as the difference
between the weighted average of the prices of higher-priced end-use classes of milk and3
the weighted average of the prices of lower-priced end-use classes of milk.  For a typical
month, the return to quota ownership was D=Pq-Pn, where D is the differential, Pq is the
quota milk price, and Pn is the overbase (non-quota) milk price.
The cut-off point that determined the share of the intermediate classes in Pq or Pn
depended on the quantity of quota relative to the quantity of milk.  Also, the weights
varied monthly depending on milk sales.  Aggregate milk prices Pq and Pn each varied
widely because the underlying class prices varied.  In summary, D varied because of
variation in (1) milk sales by class, (2) amount of quota, and (3) class prices.
Since1994, the payment per unit of quota has been fixed and invariant with
respect to milk market conditions.  Under this system, the first step in dispersing pool
revenue is to allocate daily $0.195 per pound of solids-not-fat (snf) for each pound of
quota owned.  No assignment is made for fat.  This dispersal is also defined as $1.70 (8.7
lbs. snf/cwt. milk*$0.195/lbs. snf) per cwt. quota in terms of fluid milk.  For aggregate
quota quantity Q, (in snf terms), the total revenue assigned to quota is $0.195*Q, and the
quota revenue for an individual is $0.195*Qi, where Qi varies from zero (for about 20%
of producers) up to total milk output (for a few percent of producers in any month).  The
rest of the milk pool revenue (Rn)
Rn=R-$0.195*Q
is dispersed according to milk production.  The price paid for milk is Pn=Rn/M.  The
quota milk price (Pq) is defined as the sum of the $0.195 and the overbase price, i.e.
Pq=$0.195 + Pn.  Total revenue for producer i (TRi) is simply
TRi= Mi*Pn+Qi*0.195.4
Quota, subject to the program regulations, is an asset that entitles the owner to a quota
dividend.  Since 1994, the dividend, or return, to quota ownership has been simply
$0.195 per pound of snf per day.  Prior to 1994, the per unit return to quota was the
difference of the two random prices Pq and Pn.  As Sumner and Wolf (1996) show, quota
ownership does not affect marginal production decisions because the marginal revenue is
a function solely of the overbase and not the quota price.
Characteristics and regulations of the asset market are also important.  Quota can
be bought and sold, but the program limits ownership to farmers who maintain a valid
market milk permit and produce market milk in the State of California from at least five
cows (State of California).  Once purchased, no quota can be sold for two years, except
for cases of hardship, and a producer who sells quota cannot buy back quota for two
years.  New quota has been allocated intermittently following a formula, which has been
adjusted occasionally. New quota is allocated to incumbent quota owners and new
producers. Total new quota created has generally been tied to the quantity of Class 1
usage (Ekboir, Sumner, and Wolf).  In 1978, the State broke from this basic policy by
giving out quota without consideration of Class 1 sales (Boynton). The last dispersal of
quota was 1992.  New quota and quota purchased from cases of hardship may not be sold
for five years.
Note, these stipulations do not require a farmer to produce each month as much as
or more milk than the quantity of quota owned. The provisions of the quota program do
not state a minimum quantity of milk that a producer must supply.  The State of
California, by law, cannot limit the amount of milk that a farmer can produce (State of
California Food and Agricultural Codes, Section 62721).5
Returns to Quota Ownership
Monthly benefits to owning a pound of California dairy quota is comprised of
three components:
Bt = [Qti*(Pqti – Pnti)*Dt + D(Vt)*Qti + D(Qti)*Vt]/Vt-1
As discussed above the daily revenue flow is based on the differential, the difference
between the quota price (Pqti) and the overbase (Pnti) per pound of snf multiplied by the
number of days in the month (Dt).  For an annual return, the monthly flow is summed to
obtain the annual flow.
Capital gains (or loses) may also be calculated for each period.  The monthly
capital gain is D(Vt) = (Vt-Vt-1) where Vt is the average price paid for quota purchased
during month t.  The annual capital gain is the quota price for December of the year t less
the t-1 year’s December quota price.
The calculation of the contribution to returns of new quota to quota ownership
begins by taking the new quota (nt) distributed in January and dividing that quantity (lbs.
snf) by the total quota in the State (tt).  This quantity, (D(Qti) = (nt/tt)), is valued using the
January price of that year.  For the monthly return, each month is allocated one-twelfth of
the new quota value; D(Qti)*Vt = [(nt*Vt)/tt]/12.  The return to quota is the sum of these
components.  The rate of return or benefit is the return divided by the t-1 month's price
for the monthly returns or divided by the December price of the t-1 year for the annual
returns.
The Data
We have assembled monthly observations on the average price of quota, the quota
milk price and the overbase milk price (all in dollars per pound of snf) for the full period6
since the program’s inception in July 1969. We also have information on new quota
allocations.  From these data other values are constructed, the next section describes these
computations.  Additional data used for the analysis below include the rate of return of
the S&P500 and the yield of the 10-Year U. S. Treasury Securities.
Risk and Returns to Quota Ownership
We focus now on returns to quota ownership and  portfolio risk of investing in the
quota.  Portfolio risk is associated with variability of returns and the relationship of that
variability with the variability of a broader portfolio, how the quota fits into the larger
farm portfolio.  This analysis is conducted through a variety of hypothesis tests
concerning the risk nature of the asset.
We begin by examining the monthly returns to quota and the variability of these
returns.  Table 1 provides the mean, standard deviation and coefficient of variation for
each of the components of quota returns and the total returns.  This table also provides
these statistics for the rate of return calculated on monthly data and, for comparison, the
overbase milk price.
Several findings in Table 1 merit comment.  First, in contrast to investments in
many equities, most of the return to quota ownership has come from the monthly flow of
income in the form of the differential.  More than 90 percent of the returns are from the
differential—only about 5 percent are from capital gains.  Note, the distribution of new
quota has provided only a tiny contribution to the benefit of owning quota on average.
Second, the capital gain is the dominant contributor to the monthly variation in returns.
The coefficient of variation in monthly returns (3.97) is dominated by wild swings in
capital gains which is reflected in wild swing in the price of quota (often by 20 to 307
percent in a single month).  Notice, also, that the coefficient of variation of the
differential is slightly larger than the coefficient of the overbase milk price which implies
that the price of quota milk contributed variability and that the two milk prices do not
move together.
Monthly data may be of limited interest in the context of capital gains, and this is
particularly true for milk quota because of the restrictions on liquidity and the restrictions
that limit speculative investments in quota.  Table 2 provides statistics on annual returns.
The mean returns information tells the same story as Table 1.  Also, coefficients of
variation for the differential and new quota are similar to those based on monthly data.
Now, however, the coefficient of variation of capital gains is only one fifth of its previous
value and the coefficient of variation
2 of total quota returns is now below 1.0.
The final three rows of Table 2 provide information on the annual average return
to investing in milk quota relative to the S&P500 and a 10-year Treasury bill over the
same 26-year period.  Both the mean rate of return and the standard deviation are higher
for the investment in quota, but the coefficient of variation of returns is lower than for an
investment in the S&P500 stock index.  At more than 23 percent, the rate of return to
owning quota is remarkable.  Further, since most of the return comes from the monthly
flow, an investor who plans to simply hold quota for the long term is less concerned with
variation in annual quota price, so the overall coefficient of variation may be less relevant
compared to the S&P500 where more than 80 percent of returns are derived from capital
gains alone.
The riskiness of an investment can only be assessed in the context of the rest of an
investor's portfolio.  A standard approach to this issue in dealing with financial assets is8
to examine the relationship of returns to the S&P500.  Table 3 provides the covariance
and correlation coefficients of the rate of return for quota and S&P500.  The relationship
has been negative over the 26 years of data with a correlation coefficient of -0.30.  the
correlation with the Treasury bill returns is -0.06.  (For comparison we also present the
correlation between the Treasury bill returns and the S&P500.)  The variance of a
portfolio made up of equal parts of quota and S&P500 stocks is equal to
var(portfolio) = var(quota)*0.25 + var(S&P500)*0.25 + 2*cov(quota, S&P500)*0.25.
Using this variance, the standard deviation of this mixed portfolio is 10.17 percent.  The
mean return is 19.04 percent, so the coefficient of variation is 0.53--well below that of
either the S&P500 or the quota alone.
A common approach to measuring the contribution of a investment to the
riskiness of the overall portfolio is to calculate the "beta" defined as the covariance of
return between an item with the base portfolio divided by the variance of the base
portfolio.  The beta is also just the slope coefficient of the simple regression of the item
of interest on the base portfolio returns.  Four betas are presented in column 3 of Table 3.
In the context of the S&P500, the case of common stock betas are usually positive and in
the range of 0.7 to 1.5.  All our betas are negative reflecting the potential for
diversification.
Now let us consider how an investment in quota or other assets relate to the
investment in dairy farming itself.  For most dairy farmers, the investment in the dairy
farms (cows, land, equipment, machinery, human capital, etc.) is a very large portion of
the full portfolio.  Returns to this investment are in the form of farm profits, and our9
interest now is of the variation in the rate of return to dairy farm investments in California
from 1971 through 1996.
Data on the rate of return to dairy farm investments is not available for California;
we, therefore, do not calculate betas with this as the base portfolio.  However, as a proxy
of the variation in dairy farm profits (as opposed to investment in quota) overtime we
turn to the variation in the price of overbase milk.  Especially in California, random
variation in milk output per cow is small, and variable costs, mostly labor and feed are
relatively more under the control of the farm.  Feed costs and the milk price are positively
correlated (especially in annual data), but we argue that variation over time in the price of
milk drives variation in profits.
Table 4 presents covariances and correlation coefficients between the price of
milk (as proxy for dairy farm profits) and the S&P500 and returns to quota.   The
correlation with the monthly flow return to quota (the differential) is negative as
expected, but the correlation is small.  The correlation between the price of milk and the
capital gains in quota is also negative.  This correlation may be surprising.  One
hypothesis is that when dairy farm profits are low, more farmers are likely to sell quota
(as a relatively liquid asset) and fewer farmers have ready capital (or credit) for quota
purchase.  Therefore, low milk prices would be associated with a decline in quota price;
thus, we would expect a positive correlation in Table 4.  What we see, however, is a
negative correlation.  The other possible effect is that, when milk price is high, monthly
return to quota is low and may be expected to remain low.  This effect seems to dominate
the relationship.10
Finally, Table 4 shows that returns to quota (the sum of the three components) is
negatively correlated with milk price and returns to investing in the S&P500 is positively
correlated with milk price.  Quota returns co-vary negatively with the stock market while
dairy farm profits co-vary positively with the stock market index.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the portfolio characteristics of California dairy quota.  The
rate of return to quota has been relatively high (at least on a before tax basis).  The
variability of returns is also high relative to government bonds but not relative to a
diversified portfolio of stocks.  Unlike stocks, most of the return to quota is from the
monthly differential (like a dividend).  However, as with stocks, most of the variability in
returns is from the capital gains.
We also examine how returns to quota ownership co-vary with other investment
options and with dairy farm profits.  These results show (with negative covariance) that
investment in quota lowers risk in the overall portfolio, whether quota is added to stocks
or to investment in dairy farming.  This last finding highlights the difference between this
California dairy quota relative to production or marketing quotas (Lermer and Stanbury).
In this paper we have set aside the issue of default risk.  However, by showing
that the investment in quota has had a relatively high rate of return and that this return is
negatively correlated with investment in either stocks and dairy farm profits our analysis
re-enforces the importance of the default component of policy risk.11
Table 1. Analysis of Monthly Data (January 1971 to December 1996)
Mean Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation
1
Monthly Differential
2,3 5.28 1.96 0.37
Capital Gains
4 0.30 22.51 75.53
New Quota Return
5 0.17 0.34 2.01
Quota Return
6 5.73 22.74 3.97
Quota Rate of Return 2.06% 7.19% 3.49
Overbase Milk Price
2 0.67 0.20 0.30
                                                       
1 The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean.
2 The overbase milk price and the differential are in terms of dollars per pound of solids-
not-fat.
3 The differential is the difference between the quota milk price and the overbase milk
price in dollars per pound of snf times the number of days in the month
4 Quota return is the sum of the three components:  monthly differential, capital gains,
and new quota return.
5 The new quota value is the value of quota disbursed in January of some years.  This
variable is the total new pounds of snf quota given out multiplied by the January quota
price divided by the total pounds of snf quota already in the system.
6 The quota rate of return is composed of a monthly dividend, monthly capital gains, and
new quota disbursals for the year divided by 12.12
Table 2.  Analysis of Annual Data (1971 to 1996)
Mean Standard Deviation Coefficient of Variation
Overbase Milk Price
1 0.67 0.19 0.29
Annual Differential
1,2 63.15 16.30 0.26
Capital Gains
2 3.58 53.55 14.97
New Quota Return 2.00 3.69 1.84
Quota Return
3 68.73 57.38 0.84
Quota Rate of Return 23.22% 19.47% 0.84
S&P500 Rate of Return
4 14.86% 14.22% 0.96
10-Year Treasury Bill
5 8.61% 2.16% 0.25
                                                       
1 The overbase milk price and the differential are in dollars per pound of solids not fat,
and both are summed over the year.
2 The differential and capital gains are the sum of the respective12 monthly returns.
3 The total quota return is composed of a the sum of the differential, annual capital gains
(from the December of the previous year to the present year's December), and new quota
disbursals valued at the quota price in January of the present year.
4 The S&P500 rate of return was constructed from the Economic Report of the President
1998.  This series is the change in the annual Standard & Poor's Composite Index (1941-
43=10) plus the dividend price ratio (Table B-95).
5 The 10-Year Treasury bill is the yield taken from the Economic Report to the President
1998 (U.S. Treasury Securities, Constant Maturities, Table B-73).13
Table 3. Covariance, Correlation Coefficient, and Beta
1 for Annual Rates of Returns
Correlation
Coefficient Covariance Beta
Quota and S&P500 -0.30 -0.0084 -0.41
Quota and U. S. Treasury Bill -0.06 -0.00026 -0.55
S&P500 and U. S. Treasury Bill -0.13 -0.00038 -0.02
U. S. Treasury Bill and S&P500 -0.13 -0.00038 -0.82
                                                       
1 The beta is the ratio of the covariance of x and y and the variance of y, i.e.
Cov(x,y)/var(y).  In this table, x is the first variable, and y is the second variable in each
pair.
Table 4.  Covariances and Correlation Coefficients
Monthly Annual Monthly Annual
Covariance Correlation Coeff.
Overbase Milk Price and Differential -0.09 -0.33 -0.22 -0.11
Overbase Milk Price and Capital Gains -0.33 -2.78 -0.07 -0.27
Overbase Milk Price and New Quota Value -0.007 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12
Overbase Milk Price and Quota Return -0.42 -3.21 -0.09 -0.29
Overbase Milk Price
and Quota Rate of Return -0.002 -0.02 -0.12 -0.40
Overbase Milk Price
and S&P500 Rate of Return N/A
1 0.009 N/A 0.32
                                                       
1 N/A indicates the data is not available.14
                                                                                                                                                                    
Endnotes
1Because minimum prices are based on multiple components, the pool revenue is based
on eleven prices and end-use demands (snf and fat for each class and the fluid carrier for
Class 1).  However, for clarity of explanation, we approximate this with a single price per
class.
2An interesting finding in Table 2 is that the coefficient of variation for the differential is
now slightly smaller than for the overbase milk price.  The low monthly covariance of
overbase and quota milk prices, due to lags in price formulas, is reduced with annual
data.15
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